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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 09-3314 
___________ 
 
TERENCE KIMBERG, 
             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON; 
WYOMING VALLEY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, INC.; 
CAROLINE RASKIEWICZ, Individually and as 
Program Director for the University of Scranton 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-1209 
(Honorable James M. Munley) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 4, 2010 
Before:  SCIRICA, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 27, 2010) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Terence Kimberg was dismissed from the University of Scranton’s Nurse 
Anesthesia Program in 2006. He sued the University of Scranton, the Wyoming Valley 
Health Care System and Caroline Raskiewicz, Program Director for, inter alia, breach of 
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contract. After dismissing Kimberg’s other causes of action, the District Court granted 
Defendants summary judgment on his breach of contract claim. We will affirm. 
I. 
 In August 2004, Kimberg enrolled in the Nurse Anesthesia Program offered by the 
University in conjunction with Wyoming Valley. The Program consists of two essential 
components; enlisted students must both take courses within the University and complete 
clinical work at various local hospitals. As part of his clinical studies, Kimberg regularly 
administered anesthesia to patients under the supervision of a certified registered nurse 
anesthetist. (“CRNA”). For each day Kimberg was at the clinical site, the attending 
CRNA evaluated his performance.1  
 During a December 5, 2005 meeting in Raskiewicz’s office, Kimberg received 
written notification that his performance had fallen short of Program standards. 
Specifically, Program administrators professed concerns regarding Kimberg’s execution 
of a classroom presentation and his failure to complete certain competency evaluations.  
 
1 The Program’s Clinical Grading Policy sets forth how students within the Program are 
evaluated. Students receive daily verbal feedback from their supervising faculty members 
as well as written daily clinical evaluations. At the close of each semester, students 
undergo “Triannual Evaluations” in which their clinical mentors determine whether the 
student has made the expected progress over the course of that marking period. Should a 
student fail to meet any objective, the clinical mentor decides whether to place the 
student on probation. Although Kimberg contends he initially received uniformly positive 
feedback, ultimately upwards of six CRNAs expressed reservations to Program 
administrators concerning Kimberg’s clinical aptitude.  
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The following month, Kimberg was placed on probation for clinical performance 
deficiencies. In rendering its disciplinary determination, the Program advised Kimberg 
that he “does not appear to have the total anesthetic picture,” “consistently needs 
assistance,” “needs a large amount of help,” and “does not appear to be at the clinical 
level expected,” and moreover that multiple CRNAs had balked at the hypothetical 
prospect of allowing Kimberg to administer anesthesia to their family members.  
 While on probation, Kimberg continued to receive negative evaluations from his 
supervising CRNAs. Several witnesses testified as to Kimberg’s persistent travails. 
Patricia Harrington, chair of the University’s Department of Nursing, testified that 
Kimberg was “insubordinate” during his probationary period and had dosed patients with 
medication he had been instructed not to provide. Jo Ann Platko, the Assistant Program 
Administrator, testified Kimberg’s performance was imperiling patient safety. And 
Raskiewicz echoed this concern, indicating that a string of troubling incidents over the 
course of Kimberg’s tenure within the Program had led her to determine that Kimberg 
posed a legitimate threat to the welfare of hospital patients.  
 Having failed to ameliorate the concerns of administrators during his stint on 
probation, Kimberg was notified on March 24, 2006 that he had been terminated from the 
clinical portion of the Program. The written notice of termination cited Kimberg’s 
“failure to progress during [his] probationary period” as the official rationale for 
dismissal.  
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 Immediately thereafter, Kimberg availed himself of the grievance mechanism 
provided within the Wyoming Valley Health Care System/University of Scranton School 
of Nurse Anesthesia School Handbook.2 On March 27, Kimberg filed a formal appeal of 
his termination and requested a hearing before the University’s “Due Process Review 
Committee.” On May 9, Raskiewicz notified Kimberg that he would not be permitted to 
have legal representation at his hearing. In lieu of pressing forward without the assistance 
of counsel, Kimberg elected to refrain from further pursuing his appeal. In May 2006, the 
University dismissed Kimberg from the Program after his unsatisfactory mark in the 
clinical portion appeared on his semester grade report. 
II. 
 Kimberg commenced this action on June 15, 2006 in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. His four-count complaint sought relief for (1) breach of contract; (2) 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) denial of due process; and (4) 
tortious interference with contract. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the District Court 
granted Defendants’ motion as to three causes of action, leaving only the breach of 
contract claim.  
Without first obtaining leave of court, Kimberg filed an Amended Complaint. 
Ostensibly recognizing the impermissibility of this action, Kimberg moved to dismiss 
voluntarily his Amended Complaint. The court granted this motion, striking the 
 
2 As explained below, the Handbook was part a collection of documents that structured 
the contractual relationship between the parties. See infra Part IV.B. 
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complaint from the record. On April 17, 2007, Kimberg properly filed a motion for leave 
to file an Amended Complaint. While that motion was pending, discovery on Kimberg’s 
breach of contract claim proceeded apace. On several occasions, the parties moved by 
concurrence to extend the time to conduct discovery. Critically, it was during this time 
period that counsel elicited the deposition testimony regarding Kimberg’s alleged 
noncompliance with Program protocol that would backstop Defendants’ contention that 
Kimberg’s dismissal conformed to applicable University procedures. 
The District Court denied Kimberg’s Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Complaint on November 19, 2007. With that motion resolved, the due date for 
Defendants’ Answers to Kimberg’s Complaint was fixed at December 3, 2007. Without 
having first filed their Answers within the allotted timeframe, Defendants moved for 
summary judgment on March 20, 2008. Apprehending their error only in the course of 
briefing their summary judgment motions, Defendants filed a Joint Motion for Extension 
of Time to File Answers Nunc Pro Tunc To Plaintiff’s Complaint on April 30. Holding 
Defendants’ failure to answer justified by “excusable neglect,” the court granted 
Defendants’ motion on November 5, and Defendants filed their Answers that day. 
On January 29, 2009, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants. In their Answers to Kimberg’s Complaint, Defendants had posited a host of 
defenses collectively pointing toward the notion that Kimberg’s sanctioning and 
dismissal were occasioned by a bona fide concern for patient safety and that, 
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consequently, the disciplining fell within the proper scope of University procedures. In 
awarding Defendants summary judgment, the District Court accepted this argument and 
concluded Kimberg had failed to create a triable issue of fact as to the root cause of his 
dismissal from the Program. Because the express language of the contractual arrangement 
between the parties enabled Defendants to terminate Kimberg’s tenure with the Program 
“if an error of commission or omission jeopardizes the safety and/or welfare of the 
patient,” the District Court held Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Kimberg filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the District Court’s summary 
judgment order, wherein he argued the court’s order improperly foreclosed any 
opportunity to explore the defenses raised in the Answers during discovery. The court 
denied Kimberg’s motion, reasoning that the deposition testimony obtained during the 
oft-lengthened discovery period, replete with allusions to concerns harbored by Program 
administrators, provided Kimberg with ample notice that Defendants would mount a 
defense centered around the patient safety provision in the Handbook. Kimberg then filed 
this appeal. 3 
III. 
A. 
 We review the District Court’s decision to excuse Defendants’ late filings under 
an abuse of discretion standard. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2001); Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 
2000) (reviewing district court findings concerning excusable neglect for abuses of 
discretion). We will not disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion “unless there is a 
definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in 
the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Hanover Potato 
Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted).  
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) permits a district court to extend the 
deadline for a motion paper “for good cause . . . if the party failed to act because of 
excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). At bottom, excusable neglect requires “a 
demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and some 
reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified in the rules.” Petrucelli v. 
Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1312 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). 
 In Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392 
(1993), the Supreme Court explained that, for Rule 6(b) purposes, excusable neglect is an 
“elastic concept.” In assessing whether a party’s neglect is excusable, a court must take 
into account “all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission,” including (1) 
the danger of prejudice to the other party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential 
impact on judicial proceedings; (3) whether the cause of the delay was within the 
reasonable control of the moving party; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 
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Id. at 395.4 We have also considered the diligence of the moving party as well as whether 
the asserted inadvertence reflects either professional incompetence or an “easily 
manufactured excuse incapable of verification by the court.” In re Cendant Corp., 189 
F.R.D. 321, 324 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Dominic v. Hess Oil Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 517 (3d 
Cir. 1988)). 
B. 
 Kimberg contends Defendants concocted their “patient safety” strategy only after 
the discovery window had closed and that he was unfairly surprised by the contents of 
their Answers. By allowing Defendants to file belatedly, Kimberg contends, the District 
Court effectively allowed them to procure a summary judgment order on the basis of 
affirmative defenses he lacked an adequate opportunity to contest. This argument is 
unpersuasive. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendants’ joint 
motion. 
 Defendants demonstrated neither bad faith nor professional incompetence, nor did 
they cause Kimberg significant prejudice solely by virtue of their actions. As noted 
above, this case has had an unusual procedural history. On account of protracted 
litigation over Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Kimberg’s motion to file an Amended 
Complaint, nearly eighteen months passed between the filing of Kimberg’s Complaint 
 
4 Although the Court propounded this standard within the framework of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, we have applied it within the Rule 6(b) setting. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 323–29 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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and the due date for Defendants’ Answers. When the deadline came and went, the parties 
were fully engaged in discovery on Kimberg’s breach of contract claim. Only in 
preparing their motion for summary judgment did Defendants come to realize they had 
failed to file these Answers. The atypicality of this procedural posture lends credence to 
Defendants’ position that their failure to file within the allotted time period was an honest 
oversight and not part of a sinister, well-conceived plan to frustrate Kimberg’s discovery 
efforts. 
 Furthermore, although the Answers may have provided the first concrete 
formulation of Defendants’ patient safety strategy, Kimberg’s protestations that he was 
blindsided by this proffered defense strain credulity.5 From the outset of this litigation, 
Defendants consistently maintained they proceeded in accordance with Program 
guidelines. Their pleadings unfailingly contained accounts of Kimberg’s deficient 
performance and references to corresponding contractual language — including the 
crucial Handbook passage concerning patient safety — enabling them to impose 
appropriate discipline. The deposition testimony of Harrington, Platko and Raskiewicz 
 
5 For example, during Raskiewicz’s deposition, she testified 
“[W]e are all student advocates all the time until the point comes where 
there’s a safety issue, and then we switch gears wherein we move into 
being patient advocates. At that point, when we feel that the patient’s safety 
is at risk, we believe, according to the handbook, that we follow the rules 
and we dismiss.” 
She then went on to explain Kimberg’s clinical deficiencies had forced her to 
withdraw her support for her student in favor of securing the welfare of hospital 
patients. 
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buttressed this position and formed the basis of Defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment. Notably, these motions were filed before Defendants allegedly ambushed 
Kimberg with these defenses in their Answers. Kimberg could theoretically have elicited 
greater insight into Defendants’ strategies by serving written discovery requests or by 
conducting additional depositions before the discovery deadline. Although Kimberg 
chose not to take such steps, the record is littered with evidence alerting him to the 
position Defendants would adopt in their Answers. Kimberg’s argument that he was 
prejudiced by unanticipated defenses raised after the close of discovery thus rings hollow.  
Presumably, any prejudice suffered by Kimberg on account of the late filing could 
have been cured by additional discovery. Although Kimberg now claims that Defendants 
implicitly conditioned their joint motion for leave to file untimely answers on the 
reopening of discovery, this is simply not so. In their motion, Defendants stated, “[to] the 
extent that any denials or defenses set forth in the Defendants’ Answers raise new issues 
for discovery, Defendants do not object to the reopening of discovery on those matters.” 
However, in denying Kimberg’s motion for reconsideration, the District Court noted 
Kimberg “never sought an extension of discovery to address these issues.” Indeed, 
Kimberg inveighed against the inconvenience and the cost that it would entail. Having 
moved on multiple occasions for extensions of time to complete discovery, Kimberg 
cannot credibly argue that one final extension to accommodate Defendants’ filing would 
have resulted in severe prejudice. 
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A plaintiff does not suffer cognizable prejudice simply because he is forced to 
litigate issues raised in a late answer. Kleckner v. Glover Trucking Corp., 103 F.R.D. 553, 
556 (M.D. Pa. 1984). Because we disfavor default judgments, doubts as to whether a 
defendant should be permitted to file an untimely answer should be resolved in favor of 
allowing a determination on the merits. Gross v. Stereo Component Systems, Inc., 700 
F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1983). Therefore, any purported prejudice was attributable not to 
the untimeliness of Defendants’ Answers but instead to the lack of additional discovery, 
an issue which Kimberg did not preserve for appeal. 
IV. 
A. 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard that 
the District Court should have applied in determining whether summary judgment was 
appropriate. Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is 
proper when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving party is 
“entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). An alleged factual 
dispute is “genuine” only if the evidence bearing on the disputed fact would permit a 
reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party, and the fact is “material” only insofar as 
its adjudication “could affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive 
law.” Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990). When 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must consider the evidence in a 
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light most favorable to the nonmoving party — accepting its allegations as true, affording 
it the benefit of all legitimate inferences that may be drawn, and resolving any conflicted 
assertions in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); 
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976). 
As we will explain, Kimberg has failed to demonstrate the District Court’s 
summary judgment order turned on genuine issues of material fact being resolved in 
Defendants’ favor. Therefore, we concur with that court’s assessment that Defendants 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
B. 
 “[T]he relationship between a private educational institution and an enrolled 
student is contractual in nature; therefore, a student can bring a cause of action against 
said institution for breach of contract where the institution ignores or violates portions of 
the written contract.” Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). The 
contract between the parties “is comprised of the written guidelines, policies, and 
procedures as contained in the written materials distributed to the student over the course 
of their enrollment in the institution.” Id.  
 Defendants claim Kimberg was properly terminated from the Program according 
to the terms of the Handbook and that they therefore committed no contractual breach. As 
noted, the Handbook expressly provides that the school may place a student on probation 
and ultimately dismiss him from the program “if an error of commission or omission 
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jeopardizes the safety and/or welfare of the patient.”6 Additionally, it provides that a 
“[f]ailure to follow instructions in the clinical area will result in immediate probation for 
the 1st offense. The second offense will result in termination from the school.” 
We concur with the District Court in finding the record discloses no genuine issue 
of material fact. Viewed in the light most favorable to Kimberg, the evidence suggests his 
clinical performance was, at best, deficient. Even affording him the benefit of the 
inference that his early evaluations showed him to be a stellar student, his fall from good 
standing is well-documented. The sequence of events leading to Kimberg’s probationary 
period and eventual dismissal is chronicled in detail above. In placing Kimberg on 
probation, the Program provided him with written notice of the concerns his supervisors 
had registered. Among the delineated shortcomings were Kimberg’s alleged 
disorganization, failure to grasp the entirety of the anesthetic picture, need for constant 
assistance and unwillingness to follow through with clinical tasks. Moreover, CRNAs 
working with Kimberg expressed apprehension about the prospect of Kimberg 
 
6 According to the Handbook’s “program outcome criteria,” a prospective graduate must 
demonstrate a baseline level of competence in five general topic areas, foremost of which 
is “patient safety.” To show the requisite degree of acquired skill and knowledge within 
this field, a student must, inter alia, “[b]e vigilant in the delivery of patient care,” 
“[p]articipate in the positioning of patients to prevent injury,” and “[u]tilize standard 
precautions and appropriate infection control measures.” Raskiewicz recounted a slew of 
incidents that called into question Kimberg’s performance in this area. On separate 
occasions, she testified, Kimberg professed an inability to adjust a patient’s blood 
pressure cuff from a pediatrics setting to an adult-sized setting and then unilaterally 
decided to halve the dosage of a patient’s prescription despite indications her blood 
pressure was “very high.”  
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administering anesthesia to their family members. Their evaluation forms indicated that 
he had failed on one occasion to hook up a patient’s air line and had demonstrated a 
substandard grasp of pharmacology and the rationale for drug uses and dosages.  
 The record simply fails to support Kimberg’s position that Defendants acted 
outside the scope of the contractual agreement in invoking an overriding concern for 
patient well-being as justification for placing him on probation and ultimately dismissing 
him from the Program. According to Program policies, administrators may extend a 
probationary period to help a student if they feel he is capable of being reformed. 
Otherwise, the student is given the opportunity to withdraw or else be terminated from 
the Program. In notifying Kimberg of his dismissal, Raskiewicz wrote that he had 
“fail[ed] to progress during [his] probationary period.” With concern for patient well-
being paramount among the reasons Kimberg had landed on probation in the first place, 
Kimberg’s inability to allay administrators’ fears on this front rendered their decision to 
dismiss him appropriate under the terms of the Handbook. Kimberg was fully aware of 
the allegations leveled against his clinical competence, and Defendants properly 
exercised their contractual prerogative to safeguard patient safety.7 
 
7 Kimberg argues the contract required Defendants to follow Policy No. 60.6, a 
progressive series of disciplinary procedures. The Handbook, which stresses that the rules 
of the Program supersede those of the Wyoming Valley Health Care System (including 
Policy 60.6) and which indicates only that students must follow Policy 60.6 as it relates 
to student status, suggests otherwise. And, as the District Court noted, the policy lists 
behaviors that are inappropriate and which might precipitate disciplinary action. 
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C. 
Moreover, Kimberg claims that Defendants breached the parties’ agreement by 
denying Kimberg the opportunity to be represented by legal counsel at his hearing before 
the University’s Due Process Review Committee. As the District Court properly 
concluded, this position lacks support in either Pennsylvania law or within the scope of 
the contractual language. 
Because the relationship between a private college and its students is contractual 
in nature, a student being disciplined is entitled “only to those procedural safeguards 
which the school specifically provides.” Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 
755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (quotation omitted). While private colleges enjoy wide 
latitude to structure their internal disciplinary procedures as they see fit, Schulman v. 
Franklin & Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), they are limited by the 
principle that such procedures must be “fundamentally fair,” Psi Upsilon, 591 A.2d at 
758.  
The Program’s Due Process Policy grants students the right to appeal any action 
they feel violates their rights under established policies, rules and regulations. The 
terminal step of the grievance procedure consists of a hearing before a Due Process 
Review Committee, a body charged with rendering an impartial determination as to the 
fairness of the sanctions imposed upon the student. The Committee is empowered only to 
Significantly, behaviors that constitute threats to patient safety, such as those which 
prompted Defendants to place Kimberg on probation, are not among those listed. 
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decide if the student was afforded adequate process; determining the clinical competency 
of the student rests within the exclusive preserve of the student’s CRNA supervisors.  
First, the District Court correctly concluded that a college’s disciplinary 
procedures are not necessarily unfair simply by virtue of their failure to provide a student 
with the right to representation by counsel. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has 
held that public universities do not have to afford a “‘full-dress judicial hearing,’ subject 
to the rules of evidence or representation by counsel” to satisfy the “fundamental 
fairness” standard. Ruane v. Shippensburg Univ., 871 A.2d 859, 862 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2005). Private institutions need not endow their students with the constitutional due 
process protections that state universities are obligated to provide. Psi Upsilon, 591 A.2d 
at 758. Hence, as the District Court astutely noted, “[i]f fundamental fairness is met in a 
public school without representation by counsel, then surely, it is met in a private school 
where there is not representation by counsel.”  
Second, the Handbook did not entitle Kimberg to representation by counsel at the 
Due Process Review Committee hearing. Although the Due Process Policy does not 
stipulate that a student who requests a hearing will be prohibited from appearing 
alongside an attorney, Defendants bore no obligation to afford Plaintiff protections in 
addition to those expressly embodied in the written agreement. Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. 
Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[T]he relationship 
between a private college and its students [is] contractual in nature. Therefore, students 
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who are being disciplined are entitled only to those procedural safeguards which the 
school specifically provides.”). As explained above, the University’s procedures were 
sufficiently robust as to be fundamentally fair. In disallowing Plaintiff’s request, 
Defendants merely opted to abide by the literal terms of the Handbook rather than to 
insert a new safeguard alongside those already in place. 
V.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
